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Articles

Following the Yellow Brick Road of
Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ironic
Consequences of "Death-isDifferent" Jurisprudence
William W. Berry III*
Introduction
"Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain."
- The Wizard of Oz
"Today's opinion adds one more to the long list of substantive and procedural requirements impeding imposition of the
death penalty imposed under this Court's assumed power to invent a death-is-different jurisprudence." Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 352 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Scalia continued his scathing
attack on the Supreme Court's "death-is-different" jurisprudence, arguing that it finds "no support in the text or history of
the Eighth Amendment"' to the Constitution and rests "upon
nothing but the personal views" of the Justices. 2 Specifically,
Justice Scalia directs his outrage at the Court's applications of
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to derive certain procedural and substantive requirements in capital punishment cases. 3 While the Court has
* D.Phil Candidate, University of Oxford; J.D., Vanderbilt University; B.A.,
University of Virginia.
1. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

2. 536 U.S. at 337-38.
3. Id.
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broadly justified the need for such protections based on the notion that death as a punishment is unique because of its severity and irrevocability, 4 hence the "death-is-different" moniker,
the constitutional basis upon which these protections have been
accorded is largely the doctrine of "evolving standards of
decency."
As demonstrated below, in adopting the concept of "evolving standards of decency," the Supreme Court has eschewed
traditional methods of constitutional interpretation in favor of a
methodology that, at best, eviscerates any independent normative principle inherent in the Eighth Amendment, and, at worst,
reduces the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence to an expression of "the feelings and intuition of a majority of the Justices . . . - 'the perceptions of decency, or of penology, or of
mercy, entertained... by a majority of the small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on th[e] Court."' 5
This article first explains, in section one, how the adoption
of a purposive approach to the Eighth Amendment, consistent
with traditional methods of constitutional interpretation, may
have resulted in the abolition of the death penalty in the aftermath of Furman v. Georgia, and nonetheless, would presently
serve as a legitimate method for applying the Eighth Amendment to capital cases. 6 In section two, this article exposes the
inherent flaws in the evolving standards of decency approach,
the tool by which the Court has "assumed power" and "invented" standards unique to death penalty jurisprudence. In
section three, this article argues that following the "wizards" on
the Court down the "yellow brick road" of the evolving standards of decency has ironic jurisprudential and sociological outcomes, including crippling the ability of the Eighth Amendment
4. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the
Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004). See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 187 (1976) ("There is no question that death as a punishment is unique
in its severity and irrevocability."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (death differs from life imprisonment because of its "finality"); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) ("the death sentence is unique in its severity
and in its irrevocability.. ."); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616-17 (2002) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (as "death is not reversible," DNA evidence that the convictions of
numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming).
5. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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to serve as a non-majoritarian constitutional basis for the abolition of capital punishment.
I.

The Purposive Theory of Constitutional Interpretation

The Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, as incorporated
to apply to the states, serves to "prevent misconstruction or
abuse of ...powers" through its use of "declaratory and restrictive clauses," which place certain limitations on the legislative
power of those states.7 Accordingly, the laws passed by state
legislatures receive little constitutional scrutiny, generally
speaking, unless they concern "fundamental" matters identified
in the Bill of Rights.8 When this is the case, however, state laws
lose their presumption of constitutionality and instead are
given stricter scrutiny, with the burden shifting to the state to
demonstrate a compelling reason why the law is necessary in
light of the language in the Bill of Rights, and to establish why
the end that the law seeks to accomplish could not be achieved
by some less invasive method. This method of interpretation
has been applied in First Amendment free speech and free exercise of religion cases, as well as in Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process cases. 9
A.

The Purposive Test

In 1970, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg
and Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz advocated applying this traditional method of interpretation to the Eighth
Amendment, terming it a "purposive test of constitutionality.' 10
The purposive test seeks to protect "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment," which "is nothing less than the
dignity of man," by condemning excessively severe punish7. U.S. CONST. pmbl. In Furman, the Court explained that "[tihe very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Furman,408 U.S. at
268-69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
8. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
9. Arthur Goldberg & Alan Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
10. Id. at 1784.
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ments. 11 In order to protect these values, the Court had (prior
to 1970) interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause
to prohibit punishments that were "degrading in their severity"
and "wantonly imposed."1 2 Thus, under the purposive test,
when a punishment is demonstrated to be degrading in severity
(cruel) and wantonly imposed (unusual), the state has the burden to demonstrate that the punishment is not excessively severe. As suggested by Justice Goldberg in his dissent in
Rudolph v. Alabama, 3 a state's punishment should be declared
excessively severe and thus unconstitutional if "(a) it produces
hardship disproportionately greater than the harm it seeks to
prevent, or (b) a less severe punishment could as effectively
14
achieve the permissible ends of punishment.'
B.

The Purposive Test as Applied to Capital Punishment

As applied to capital punishment, then, the purposive test
first asks whether the death penalty is "'degrading in [its] severity,' and 'wantonly imposed."' 5 In determining what punishments are degrading in severity, the Court initially
interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause to "reach
only those methods of punishment similar to the tortures practiced during the Stuart reign in England, which the framers of
the Eighth Amendment clearly intended to forbid.' 6 Later,
however, in Weems v. United States, the Court expanded its
view of degradation, stating that "[n]o circumstance of degradation is omitted [from Eighth Amendment scrutiny] ... [iit may
be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted."' 7 The Court's
opinion in Trop v. Dulles went even further, holding that the
punishment of expatriation was unconstitutional because of its
degrading severity, causing "the total destruction of the individ11. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
12. Id.
13. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting to denial of certiorari).
14. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 1794.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1785 (citing Anthony F. Granacci, "NorCruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969)).
17. 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding unconstitutional a sentence of fifteen
years of "hard and painful labor" in ankle chains for the falsification of a public
record in the Philippines Territory); see Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at
1786.
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ual's status in organized society," as "the expatriate has lost the
right to have rights."18 Under the standards articulated in
Weems and Trop, it does not stretch the bounds of credulity to
conclude that the death penalty is a punishment degrading in
severity. 19 The pain involved in execution, both physical and
psychological, coupled with the sheer enormity of the punishment itself and resulting loss of one's existence leaves little
doubt that capital punishment is degrading in its severity
20
under the purposive test.
The requirement that the punishment at issue not be wantonly imposed, or "unusual," took two forms in the Court's jurisprudence prior to 1970. First, unusual meant what it does in
the modern vernacular: rare. This was the case in both Weems
and Trop, where the punishments at issue were not authorized
in other jurisdictions. 2' The second concept of unusualness derives its meaning from an understanding at the time of the
adoption of the English Bill of Rights of 1688, the language of
which the Eighth Amendment adopted verbatim.2 2 Unusualness here referred to the "arbitrary and discriminatory" imposition of punishment. 23 Capital punishment arguably satisfies
both of these interpretations: its imposition is rare,24and its administration is often arbitrary and discriminatory.
If capital punishment is both degrading in severity and
wantonly imposed, the states would then have the burden to
demonstrate that a less severe punishment could not achieve
the same penological goal. In practice, states would be hardpressed to satisfy this standard under any of the four common
rationales for imposing punishment: rehabilitation, isolation,
18. 356 U.S. at 101-02; see Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 1786-87.
19. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9.
20. Id. at 1786-87. The current challenges to the constitutionality of the lethal injection protocol underscore the severity and degradation that accompanies
the use of capital punishment.
21. Id. at 1789.
22. Id. at 1791; Granacci, supra note 16.
23. The cruel and unusual punishment provision of the English Bill of Rights
of 1688 has been thought by historians to be a reaction to the prosecution and
punishment of Titus Oates in 1685 by Lord Jeffrey. Oates' punishment was "unusual" in that he was singled out, despite others being similarly situated, for a punishment not authorized by statute or within the jurisdiction of the Court. Goldberg
& Dershowitz, supra note 9, at n.74; Granucci, supra note 16, at 857-59.
24. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 1791-92.
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deterrence or retribution. 25 Rehabilitation can obviously not be
accomplished by capital punishment, and isolation can clearly
be accomplished by the less severe penalty of life imprisonment.
Given the "inconclusive" nature of the evidence of the effect of
capital punishment on future crime, the goal of deterrence
would be likewise difficult to establish as a compelling state interest.26 Finally, retribution is problematic, and arguably unattainable, because it is difficult to determine the level of
punishment needed to satisfy this "primal community passion"
with any number of severe punishments, including ones that
the Eighth Amendment clearly prohibits (i.e., torture).27
Given the circumstances surrounding Furman, the purposive test, if wholly applied, would likely have resulted in a decision that capital punishment is cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment. Even if the Court chose not to go that far,
the test could still function as an objective standard by which
various applications of capital punishment could be assessed.
The purposive test would no doubt have achieved many of the
same results of the evolving standards jurisprudence (see infra), but in a manner that would focus on the interpretation of
empirical evidence proffered by states tied to their espoused pe25. Id. at 1796.
26. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(noting the "inconclusive empirical evidence" concerning deterrence). Compare
Cass Sunstein & Adam Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STN. L. REV. 703 (2005), with Carol
Steiker, No, CapitalPunishment is not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology,
and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005).
27. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 1796. See Furman, 408 U.S. at
344 (Marshall, J., concurring).
It is plain that... punishment for the sake of retribution was not permissible under the Eighth Amendment. This is the only view ...if the 'cruel and
unusual' language were to be given any meaning. Retribution surely underlies the imposition of some punishment on one who commits a criminal act.
But, the fact that some punishment may be imposed does not mean that any
punishment is permissible. If retribution alone could serve as a justification
for any particular penalty, then all penalties selected by the legislature
would by definition be acceptable means for designating society's moral approbation of a particular act. The 'cruel and unusual' language would thus
be read out of the Constitution ....

Id. See also CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci trans.,
Prentice Hall 1st ed. 1963) (1764) (arguing for the abolition of the death penalty
focusing on the futility, from the point of social welfare, of torture and capital punishment as means to achieve retribution for victims).
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nological goals. Importantly, the purposive test would also help
ensure that punishments of non-capital defendants (such as
those facing life without parole) would receive the same Eighth
28
Amendment protections as capital cases.
II.

The Fundamental Flaws of the Evolving Standards of
Decency Doctrine

As with the purposive test above, the evolving standards
inquiry seeks to determine whether a particular punishment is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment. The Court explained
in Coker v. Georgia that a punishment is "'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2)
is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 29 To
determine whether a punishment meets these tests, the Court
examines the historical practice with respect to the punishment
at the time that the Constitution and Bill of Rights were
adopted and whether the punishment is acceptable under soci30
ety's evolving standards of decency.
A.

The Derivation of the Evolving Standards of Decency

The evolving standards of decency concept emerged from
the Court's dicta in Trop: "[the Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."31 To determine what the applicable Eighth Amendment standards of decency are, the Court
tells us that "those evolving standards should be informed by
'objective factors to the maximum possible extent,"'32 but "the
Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Justices'] own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." 33 Ac28. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), with Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991) (assessing the degree to which the concept of proportionality
applies to non-capital cases under the Eighth Amendment).
29. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
31. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
32. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
33. Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
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cording to the Court, the "most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures," although it has also used other objective barome34
ters such as juries, public opinion and international norms.
Therefore, to determine what the applicable evolving standard
of decency is, the Court looks to state legislatures to determine
whether a consensus exists, and then its "own judgment is
'brought to bear,' by asking whether there is reason to disagree
with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators ."3
B.

The ConstitutionalFlaws of the Evolving Standards of
Decency

As a constitutional rule, the evolving standards doctrine is
problematic in two fundamental respects. First, the standard's
objective criteria ensure that the Eighth Amendment is
"drained of any independent integrity as a governing normative
principle." 36 The objective criteria rely exclusively on public
opinion as expressed by the legislative enactments of the state
legislatures, and if they are determinative of the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, then the Amendment can do no more than
reflect public opinion.37 Thus, the Eighth Amendment can, at
best, serve merely to limit the power of certain states to employ
38
punishments departing from the norms of their fellow states.
Further, unless a majority of state legislatures elect to ban capital punishment, the death penalty cannot be interpreted under
34. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
35. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
36. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 1779 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319, 345 (1957)).
37. See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1089 (2006) (identifying the flaws of using state legislation as evidence of the
evolving standards of decency).
38. As Justice Marshall wrote in Lockett v. Ohio, "[t]hat the State of Ohio
chose to permit imposition of the death penalty under a purely vicarious theory of
liability seems to belie the notion that the Court can discern the 'evolving standards of decency,' embodied in the Eighth Amendment, by reference to state 'legislative judgment.'" 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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the evolving standards test to be a cruel and unusual punishment. 39 As aptly put by Justice Brennan in Furman,
[ilf the judicial conclusion that a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' 'depend[ed] upon virtually unanimous condemnation of the
penalty at issue,' then, '[1]ike no other constitutional provision,
[the Clause's] only function would be to legitimize advances already made by the other departments and opinions [that are] already the conventional wisdom.' We know that the Framers did
not envision 'so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human
40
rights.'
The second problematic aspect of the evolving standards
test is its importation of the Justices' subjective views into the
determination of what the current applicable standard of decency is. Although the Court in Coker instructed that "Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely
the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent,"
the Justices have done exactly that by inserting their subjective
views into the Eighth Amendment calculus. 41 This is particularly troublesome in cases such as Atkins v. Virginia and Roper
39. As a majority of western nations have abolished the death penalty, see
(3d ed. 2002),

ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE

commentators have argued for the application of international standards to this
test. See William Schabas, InternationalLaw and the Death Penalty:Reflecting or
Promoting Change? in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION (Hodgkin-

son & Schabas eds., 2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World
Opinionon the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIs. L. REV. 1085 (2002). While the Court
has a long history of citing foreign law, it has only recently used such authority as
a basis for striking down state legislation. Stephen Calabresi & Stephanie
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743
(2005). However, injecting global norms as the method for interpreting the meaning of the United States Constitution is problematic on many levels. Stephen Calabresi, Symposium: Equality, Privacy and Lesbian and Gay Right after Lawrence
v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004). See also Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote
Address at the American Enterprise Institute: Outsourcing American Law (Feb.
21, 2006) ("What reason is there to believe that other dispositions of a foreign country are so obviously suitable to the morals and manners of our people that they can
be judicially imposed through constitutional adjudication?").
40. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
41. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Others have warned of the
dangers of non-democratic elites substituting their own values in place of popular
ones. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword: On
Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 51 (1978).
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v. Simmons, where the objective evidence of consensus among
the state legislatures is not firmly established, because it creates the perception that the Court's interpretation of the objective standards is merely a pretext for the expression of their
subjective views. 42 Thus, the meaning of the Eighth Amendment now possesses a certain tenuousness, flipping in the wind
of public opinion 43 and anchored only by the subjective views of
44
the Justices currently sitting on the Court.
III.

A.

The Application of the Evolving Standards of Decency
Doctrine and its Jurisprudential and
Sociological Outcomes

The Adoption of Evolving Standards

In Furman, the Court first entertained the question of
whether the death penalty, as applied, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Several of the Justices implicitly enThe notion that the genuine values of the people can most reliably be discerned by a non-democratic elite is sometimes referred to in the literature as
'the Fuhrer principle,' and indeed it was Adolph Hitler who said that '[m]y
pride is that I know no statesman in the world who with greater right than I
can say he is the representative of his people.' . . . [Similarly,] '[tihe Soviet
definition' of democracy .. also involves the 'ancient error' of assuming that
'the wishes of the people can be ascertained more accurately by some mysterious methods of intuition open to an elite rather than by allowing people to
discuss and vote and decide freely.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
[Tihe Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed
over the past 15 years . . . [is attributed] not to the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, but to 'the evolving standards of decency' of our national society ....
Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this
Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.
Id.
43. See, e.g., David Garland, The Cultural Uses of CapitalPunishment, 4 PUNISHMENT & Soc'y 459, 479 (2002) ("If 'evolving standards of public decency' had
once justified the Court's objections to capital punishment there were now clear
signs that public standards in many states had ceased to evolve in that direction.").
44. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), with Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002); compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), with
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (reversing interpretations of the Eighth Amendment based on
evolving standards of decency analysis).
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dorsed aspects of the purposive test (with Brennan and Douglas
both citing Goldberg and Dershowitz) in striking down the
death penalty as applied because of its arbitrary and discriminatory ("unusual") character. Several of the Furman plurality
also implicitly supported the concept that death was a punishment of degrading severity ("cruel") in going to great lengths to
45
explain how death was different.
Four years later in Gregg v. Georgia, however, the Court's
view of the application of the Eighth Amendment shifted away
from "purposive" concepts and toward "evolving standards of
decency" concepts as the Court upheld the new death penalty
statutes. 46 The Court in Gregg explained:
Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically
elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the legislature to select the
least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of
the representatives of the people.
This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined
with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative
judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. '[I1n a
democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
47
people.'
Despite all of the Court's rhetoric that "death-is-different"
in Furman, the Court in Gregg assumes that the meaning of
45. According to Justice Stewart, death is "unique in its total irrevocability."
408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Because the "finality of death precludes
relief," the executed person has "lost the right to have rights." Id. at 290 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Brennan also wrote that the "uniqueness of death is its
extreme severity," manifested "most clearly in its finality and enormity." Id. at
288-89. Thus, "[as] the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long ...there is a corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
46. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court of course did not repudiate the narrowing
concept of Furman and its requirement of individualized sentencing; these concepts of avoiding arbitrariness because "death-is-different" are vestiges of the conceptual framework endorsed by the purposive test. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S.
280; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 436 U.S. 921 (1978).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Berger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
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cruel and unusual punishment rests on public opinion (whether
in 1791 or the present) not on constitutional principle (degrading severity and wanton imposition). 48 In sum, the Court places
higher scrutiny on certain death penalty cases not because they
are degrading in severity and wanton in their imposition, i.e.
cruel and unusual punishments, but only when current public
opinion (or current Justice opinion) dictates that capital punishment is not appropriate in a particular circumstance.
B.

Jurisprudentialand Sociological Outcomes of the
Evolving Standardsof Decency

The Court's subsequent Eighth Amendment decisions have
essentially flowed from this concept in deciding to add the following substantive and procedural protections: a prohibition of
the death penalty for rape of an adult woman, 49 for felony murder absent a showing that the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, 50 for any person under the age of
sixteen at the time of the crime, 51 as the mandatory punishment
for any crime,5 2 for mentally retarded individuals, 53 for individ48. See Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN.L. REV. 1245 (1974) (arguing that the level of public support concerning a mode of punishment does not have any bearing on whether such
punishments rest on constitutionally acceptable standards of morality).
49. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("[A]ttention must be given to
the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions
are to be consulted.").
50. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) ("Although the judgments of
legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death
penalty [in this situation].").
51. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-22 (1988) (Interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment is delegated "to future generations of judges who have been
guided by the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.'").
52. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) ("[Clentral to the
application of the Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment.") (citation omitted).
53. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 ("The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958))).
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uals who were under age eighteen at the time of the crime5 4 and
for individuals who have not received a judicial evaluation of a
55
claim of insanity.
Ultimately, however, the death penalty cannot be declared
to be a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment unless public opinion (or the subjective opinion of
five Justices) warrants that it is so. Thus, the irony in Justice
Scalia's statement in Atkins, that while "[t]here is something to
be said for popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its incremental abolition by th[e] Court," is
that without public opinion (or pretextual application of subjective Justice opinion), the Court will never be able to abolish the
death penalty per se under the Eighth Amendment in the world
of evolving standards of decency.
And in fact, the added substantive and procedural protections that Scalia bemoans may not be all that effective in protecting capital defendants from arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the death penalty.5 6 To the contrary, application
of the evolving standards doctrine may promote arbitrariness
and error by implementing standards that create the appearance of fairness but are not the product of the Court's analysis
of relevant empirical evidence. 57 Reflecting on twenty years of
participating on the Court in death penalty cases and trying to
apply the evolving standards of decency construction, Justice
Blackmun wrote,
54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005) ("To implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to
'the evolVing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to
determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be 'cruel and
unusual."').
55. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) ("[T]his Court takes into
account objective evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a
particular punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that the

Amendment protects.").
56. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 355, 398, 401 (1995).
57. The outcome in Atkins, for instance, prohibits execution of mentally retarded defendants but does not provide a standard of how to determine who is
retarded for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, leaving an opaque standard that
will in practice not be uniformly applied and instead create another level of unfairness and arbitrariness within the capital system. Michael L. Perlin, Life in Mirrors, Death Disappears:Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 183 (2003).
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[firom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I
have struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop
procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.
Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated58 simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.
Blackmun's perspective is particularly significant in that he
voted in favor of maintaining the death penalty in Furman and
Gregg, with the apparent belief that a fair and workable appli59
cation of capital punishment could be achieved.
The Court's application of the evolving standards doctrine
also has the important consequence of undermining the legiti60
macy of the Supreme Court by politicizing it as an institution.
By tying the application of the evolving standards doctrine to
the composition of a majority of the Supreme Court and their
personal (as opposed to jurisprudential) views, the determination of whether any punishment is cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment becomes merely a political choice. Likewise, if the Supreme Court, as a purportedly countermajoritarian institution bootstraps its interpretation of the
Constitution to majoritarian public opinion, it undermines its
role of neutral arbiter of the Constitution and protector of the
rights of the minority. Thus, if the Court's imposition of restrictions on the use of the death penalty is tied to current public
opinion or the subjective views of its members, then its decisions are merely written in pencil, waiting to be rewritten.

58. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Governor George Ryan, I Must Act, Address at Northwestern University
School of Law (Jan. 11, 2003) reprinted in AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT
MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION (2003) ("[Olur three year study has found only more
questions about the fairness of [the Illinois capital system].").
59. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. The Supreme Court gains little by entering the political fray surrounding
the death penalty. See, e.g., Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105; Jeff Woods, Public Outrage Nails a Judge, THE
NASHVILLE BANNER, Aug.

2, 1996.
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An Opportunity to Move Away from Evolving Standards?

On September 25, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Baze v. Rees, to address the question of
whether the lethal injection protocol used in Kentucky violates
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 6 1 This protocol 62 has been challenged on the
61. No. 07-5439, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 9066 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (granting certiorari), amended by No. 07-5439, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 11115 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2007). Kentucky's lethal injection protocol is not the first to be called into question.
California, Missouri and Tennessee have all had their respective protocols declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment since 2006. See Morales v.
Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006), affd per curiam, 438 F.3d 926
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006) (requiring California to provide
medical personnel to ensure that the inmate was unconscious during the procedure or alter its lethal injection protocol); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006
WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) ("determin[ing] that Missouri's current method of administering lethal injections subjects condemned inmates to an
unacceptable risk of suffering unconstitutional pain and suffering"), rev'd, 487
F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the district court's holding that the
state's revised protocol violated the Eighth Amendment); Harbison v. Little, No.
3:06-01206, slip op. at 55-56 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2007) ("[Tlhe court finds that
the plaintiffs pending execution under Tennessee's new lethal injection protocol
violates the Eighth Amendment ....The new protocol presents a substantial risk
of unnecessary pain ....").
62. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained the protocol in its entirety in determining that the protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Kentucky
Constitution:
The protocol for lethal injection execution begins with the availability of a
therapeutic dose of diazepam if it is requested. Diazepam, commonly referred to as Valium, is an anti-anxiety agent used primarily for the relief of
anxiety and associated nervousness and tension. Certified phlebotomists
and emergency medical technicians are allowed up to an hour to then insert
the appropriate needles into the arm, hand, leg or foot of the inmate.
Three grams of sodium thiopental, commonly referred to as Sodium
Pentathol, are then injected. This drug is a fast acting barbiturate that renders the inmate unconscious. At this level of ingestion the person is rendered unconscious for hours. The line is then flushed with 25 milligrams of a
saline solution to prevent adverse interaction between the drugs.
Fifty milligrams of pancuronium bromide, commonly referred to as
Pavulon, follows. This drug causes paralysis. The purpose is to suspend
muscular movement and to stop respiration or breathing. The line is again
flushed with 25 milligrams of a saline solution to again prevent any adverse
interaction between the drugs.
Finally, 240 milligrams of potassium chloride is injected. This chemical
disrupts the electrical signals required for regular heart beat and results in
cardiac arrest. An electrocardiogram verifies the cessation of heart activity.
A doctor and a coroner then verify the cause of death.
Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 212 (2007).
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grounds that it causes an unconstitutional risk of unnecessary
63
pain and suffering.
Rather than look to a majority of jurisdictions to determine
what the prevailing standard of decency is, the Court should
apply the purposive test advocated here in determining whether
the lethal injection protocol at issue is "degrading in severity"
and "wantonly imposed," i.e., cruel and unusual. As explained
above, the death penalty as applied will likely meet both of
those standards, so the test should be whether the state of Kentucky could demonstrate that the lethal injection protocol is the
least severe procedure by which it could achieve its desired pe64
nological goal.
At a minimum, the Court should strike down the Kentucky
protocol because there is evidence that the same end (death)
could be achieved in a manner that results in substantially less
risk of pain and suffering, regardless of whether the sentence
imposed achieves the state's penological goal. 65 By finding that
the protocol creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Court can move its jurisprudence back in the direction of the purposive test and away
from the concept of evolving standards of decency, even if it does
not entertain the broader question of whether Kentucky can
demonstrate a compelling need for the death penalty in the
66
cases of Petitioners Baze and Bowling.
V.

Repudiation of the Evolving Standards of Decency:
A Road Map out of Oz?

For abolitionists, a close examination of the evolving standards jurisprudence suggests doing the unthinkable: agree (to
63. Indeed, the Kentucky protocol is similar to most other states, almost all of
which use lethal injection as the method of execution. See, e.g., Deborah W.
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death
Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 50 (2007).
64. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(dissenting to denial of certiorari).
65. See generally Baze Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (July 11, 2007).
66. While it is important to note that Baze is brought as a civil action challenging the death penalty procedure and not an appeal of a criminal sentence as in
the other cases discussed herein, this case could nonetheless serve as the basis for
shifting the doctrine back in the direction implicitly adopted in Furman,and away
from the "evolving standards" concept adopted in Gregg. See Baze, 217 S.W.3d
207.
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some extent) with Scalia. In order to abolish the death penalty
in a manner not subject to the whim of public opinion, the Court
needs to repudiate its evolving standards construct and return
to first principles to apply the purposive test. As indicated
above, there is still consensus on the Court that "death-is-different" (cruel) and that the death penalty continues to be applied
in an arbitrary manner (unusual). Assuming this is true, the
Court can place the burden back on the states to demonstrate,
in a compelling manner, how capital punishment achieves any
proper penological goal that a lesser punishment could not.
For those who believe that the death penalty should be
used, the purposive test also has appeal in that it provides a
better framework for defining the instances where the death
penalty should be used. Rather than subjecting Eighth Amendment analysis to the willy-nilly views of Supreme Court Justices, the purposive test ties the use of the death penalty to the
penological goals of the states and in that way, promotes consistency. As noted, the evolving standards of decency doctrine promotes unnecessary arbitrariness that impedes the fair
application of capital punishment.
Without a doctrinal shift and a return to traditional principles, the Supreme Court will remain "behind the curtain in Oz"
in the awkward role of a super-majoritarian legislature striving
to maintain legitimacy by circumscribing its power to its interpretation of the will of the people. This is certainly not the role
of independent interpreter of the Constitution that the founding
fathers envisioned, where "[t]he judiciary . . . ha[s] neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment."67 With the Supreme
Court having led us down the "yellow brick road" of evolving
standards of decency doctrine, only to find a jurisprudential
sham without a curtain big enough for our judicial "wizards" to
hide behind, the best hope for getting out of Oz is a return to
traditional methods of constitutional interpretation.

67. THE
ed., 1961).
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